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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND
CORPORATE CHARITY: RETHINKING THE REGULATIONS
American companies bring U.S. innovation and capital to all corners of the
globe. The U.S. corporate presence abroad is seen not only in oil rigs and
factories, but also in corporate development projects and humanitarian relief
efforts.
When Haiti was hit by an earthquake in 2010, U.S. companies donated over
$146.8 million to the relief effort. Despite this impressive display of global
engagement, commentators suggested that the U.S. anticorruption laws had
discouraged corporations from greater involvement. Even with the laws in force,
however, reports of corruption in the relief effort soon surfaced, derailing Haiti’s
recovery. Foreign aid that feeds corruption will never achieve sustainable growth,
but development efforts will similarly fail if U.S. anticorruption laws discourage
corporate philanthropy.
This Comment analyzes the application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) to international corporate charity. It shows how the FCPA’s ambiguity
has the unfortunate effect of being both over- and under-inclusive, discouraging
bona fide charity while at the same time failing to capture corrupt donations.
This Comment proposes a modification to FCPA enforcement: the creation of a
safe harbor option. This will offer businesses the opportunity to “buy” a rebuttable
presumption of legitimacy for their charitable donations by publically disclosing
the payments, projects, and recipients of their philanthropy. Granting a
presumption of legitimacy to disclosed donations will ameliorate many of the overinclusive aspects of the FCPA. The increased disclosure will allow the public to
monitor corporate charity and question suspicious gifts, ameliorating the underinclusive aspects of FCPA enforcement.
A greater emphasis on disclosure-based anticorruption law will encourage
robust and honest corporate philanthropy that will support long-lasting and
sustainable development around the world.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2010, a catastrophic 7.0 magnitude earthquake hit Port-au-Prince, Haiti.1
The Haitian people suffered devastating losses: over 200,000 people were
killed2 and rebuilding costs were estimated at $14 billion.3 The corporate
response was immediate,4 mobilizing over $100 million in donations in only
ten days,5 eventually totaling over $146.8 million.6 Beyond direct donations,
corporate leaders and business experts strategized about ways to encourage
investment in the rebuilding effort and to engage Haiti in the global economy.7
The generosity of the corporate response to the earthquake illustrates the
unique contributions that U.S. businesses can offer to international
development and disaster relief.8 American corporations fund successful
development projects around the world,9 and in 2008 and 2009 donated an

1 7.0 Quake Hits Haiti; ‘Serious Loss of Life’ Expected, CNN (Jan. 13, 2010, 9:51 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/01/12/haiti.earthquake/index.html.
2 Catherine Bremer & Andrew Cawthorne, Haiti Says 200,000 May Be Dead, Violence Breaks Out,
REUTERS, Jan. 15, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/15/us-quake-haiti-idUSTRE60B
5IZ20100115.
3 Catherine Keller, Funds for Haiti, BUS. CIVIC LEADERSHIP CENTER (Mar. 16, 2010), http://bclc.
uschamber.com/blog/2010-03-16/funds-haiti.
4 The term corporation will be used throughout this Comment to loosely signify all U.S. business
structures.
5 Catherine Keller, Friday Update: $106 Million in Business Aid for Haiti, BUS. CIVIC LEADERSHIP
CENTER (Jan. 22, 2010), http://bclc.uschamber.com/blog/2010-01-22/friday-update-106-million-business-aidhaiti-0.
6 Annalyn Censky, Haiti’s Top Corporate Donors, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2010/
news/1002/gallery.top_donors_to_haiti/index.html (last updated Feb. 26, 2010). Standouts include Teva
Pharmaceuticals, which donated $7 million in medication, and Jefferies & Company, which donated $7.5
million. Id.
7 WORLD ECON. FORUM, PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI: OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVESTMENT,
JOB CREATION AND GROWTH 6 (2011), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Haiti_PrivateSector
Development_Report_2011.pdf (discussing the role of and further opportunities for business investment in
Haiti’s recovery); see also Deborah Sontag, Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 2012, at A1 (“[F]ostering economic development is as important as replacing what fell down.”); Morning
Edition (National Public Radio broadcast Mar. 10, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/
transcript.php?storyId=124077512 (discussing the opportunity for Haiti’s economic development following
the earthquake).
8 CTR. FOR GLOBAL PROSPERITY, INDEX OF GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY AND REMITTANCES 2011, at 9 tbl.1
(Patricia Miller ed., 2011). See generally Heidi Metcalf Little, The Role of Private Assistance in International
Development, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1091 (2010) (discussing the importance of private funding in
international development).
9 CTR. FOR GLOBAL PROSPERITY, supra note 8, at 5–6; Geoffrey B. Sprinkle & Laureen A. Maines,
Executive Digest, The Benefits and Costs of Corporate Social Responsibility, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 445, 446
(2010) (citing examples such as Merck’s successful efforts to combat river blindness).
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estimated $9–$11 billion to charitable causes each year.10 Corporations engage
in philanthropy for a variety of reasons; some view it as part of their
responsibility to be “a good global citizen,”11 while others focus on improving
the company’s image12 or maintaining a stable working environment.13 Other
corporations use charitable activities to gain an edge over competitors,14 but
some of these targeted donations seem more like bribery than philanthropy.15
For example, in 2002 Chevron Corporation timed the announcement of a $50
million development project to coincide with negotiations over major oil assets
in Angola.16 The company pledged another $80 million when the contract was
later extended,17 amid accusations that the donations were being funneled
through the corrupt Angolan government’s network.18
A company funneling money to government leaders to win oil contracts is
exactly the type of activity that the FCPA aims to eliminate. The purpose of the
FCPA is to hold U.S. companies accountable for any bribes paid to foreign
government officials or for failing to keep financial records that would prevent
such activity from occurring.19 In the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake,
however, some commentators argued that this law did more than just
discourage bribery—it also discouraged corporate charity and investment in
the disaster relief effort.20

10 CTR. FOR GLOBAL PROSPERITY, supra note 8, at 9 ($8.9 billion); MARGARET COADY, COMM.
ENCOURAGING CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY, GIVING IN NUMBERS 4 (2009) ($11.25 billion).
11 Sprinkle & Maines, supra note 9, at 446.
12 Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate
Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 665 n.375 (1997); Veronica Besmer, Note, The Legal Character of
Private Codes of Conduct: More Than Just a Pseudo-Formal Gloss on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 279, 304 (2006).
13 Jedrzej George Frynas, The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social Responsibility:
Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies, 81 INT’L AFF. 581, 584–85 (2005).
14 Id. at 584.
15 See, e.g., Matthew Futterman, Spending Spree Marked Qatar’s World Cup Bid, WALL ST. J. EUR.
(Brussels), Jan. 13, 2011, at 1; see also Kahn, supra note 12, at 626–27 & n.187 (discussing similar problems
on a domestic scale).
16 Frynas, supra note 13, at 584.
17 Id.
18 See Jedrzej George Frynas & Geoffrey Wood, Oil & War in Angola, 28 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 587,
598 (2001).
19 See infra notes 46–55 and accompanying text.
20 Tyler Cowen, One of the Best Ways to Help Haiti: Modify FCPA, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Mar. 15,
2010, 9:24 AM), http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2010/03/one-of-the-best-ways-to-helphaiti.html; Ashby Jones, Is the FCPA Standing in the Way of Haiti’s Recovery?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Mar.
16, 2010, 4:10 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/03/16/is-the-fcpa-standing-in-the-way-of-haitis-recovery/.
But see Mike Koehler, No, We Don’t Need to Suspend the FCPA in Haiti or Any Other Country!, FCPA
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“One of the best ways to help Haiti,” one commentator wrote, is to “[p]ass
a law stating that the [FCPA] does not apply to dealings in Haiti.”21 Another
author reported that fear of FCPA prosecution “preclude[d] legitimate U.S.
entities” from engaging the Haitian reconstruction effort.22 This was not the
first time that fear of criminal prosecution delayed charitable relief. Concerns
regarding criminal liability delayed funds for Indian Ocean tsunami relief in
200423 and $50 million of State Department aid to Somalia in 2009.24 Looking
at the FCPA specifically, other commentators argued that the law was
functioning as a de facto sanction system, discouraging business engagement
in high-risk countries, such as Haiti, because of the threat of prosecution.25
Despite the debate surrounding the possible unintended effects of the law, the
FCPA remained in force against companies working on reconstruction and
relief efforts in Haiti. However, it was not long before rampant corruption and
lack of donor transparency began to plague rebuilding efforts.26 The question
then became whether the law was even having its intended anticorruption
effect.
The deleterious effects of corruption on economic, social, and political
systems have been well documented.27 Furthermore, since profits from
corruption, bribery, and transnational crime fund criminal and terrorist

PROFESSOR (Mar. 18, 2010, 8:46 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/03/no-we-dont-need-tosuspend-fcpa-in.html.
21 Cowen, supra note 20.
22 Jones, supra note 20.
23 Justin Fraterman, Criminalizing Humanitarian Relief: Are US Material Support for Terrorism Laws
Compatible with International Humanitarian Law? 2 (Jan. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1750963 (discussing the criminalization of supplying
international terrorist groups with material aid).
24 Id. at 41.
25 See, e.g., Cowen, supra note 20. See generally Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions:
Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV.
351, 366–77 (2010).
26 See, e.g., Daniel Frankel, Wyclef Jean Squandered Haitian Relief Funds, REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2011,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/27/idUS146824993020111127 (discussing one example
of the lack of accountability in the relief effort); Daniel Kaufmann, Transparent Aid for Haiti’s
Reconstruction: Capture Matters, BROOKINGS (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/
0330_haiti_transparency_kaufmann.aspx (discussing the challenges in creating a transparent Haitian
recovery).
27 See, e.g., Jeff Everett et al., Accounting and the Global Fight Against Corruption, 32 ACCT., ORGS. &
SOC’Y 513, 513–14 (2007). But see Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L BUS.
STUD. 807, 808 (2006).
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organizations around the globe,28 foreign corruption even has significant
effects on U.S. security and political interests.29 For some, however, arguments
against corruption are less persuasive if the corruption is entwined with
development aid or charity because the funds are dedicated to good works.30
However, a plethora of literature suggests that even if corrupt donations
reach needy recipients, no amount of charity will have a positive effect in
developing countries without accountability and transparency.31 Empirical
studies have found that large amounts of aid in some recipient countries
actually increase government corruption.32 In the worst cases, unmonitored or
misappropriated donations have strengthened abusive governments,33 fueled
conflict,34 or provided funding to terrorist organizations.35 On a more basic
level, corruption eats away at the narrow budget of money dedicated to good
works. In 2011, for example, almost $53 million of the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria was lost through corruption.36 Massive
corruption in international aid and charity is one major reason why “more than
$2.5 trillion in total aid” has not been more successful at reducing global
poverty.37

28 See generally Louise Shelley, The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism,
BROWN J. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 2005, at 101 (discussing the links between money funneled away
through corruption and international crime and terrorism).
29 See Spalding, supra note 25, at 360.
30 Luke R. Entelis, Defending the Charity “Loophole”: How Criticism of Congressional Charities Falls
Short, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535, 537 (2011).
31 See, e.g., Everett et al., supra note 27, at 517; Dambisa Moyo, Essay: Why Foreign Aid Is Hurting
Africa, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2009, at W1.
32 Katherine Erbeznik, Note, Money Can’t Buy You Law: The Effects of Foreign Aid on the Rule of Law
in Developing Countries, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 873, 884–85 (2011) (citing Stephen Knack, Aid
Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests, 68 S. ECON. J. 310, 310–11
(2001)).
33 Moyo, supra note 31; see also Bruce Winfield Bean, Hyperbole, Hypocrisy, and Hubris in the Aid–
Corruption Dialogue, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 781, 793 (2010) (arguing that corrupt governments have an incentive
to “maintain bad policies so as to continue receiving aid”).
34 Bean, supra note 33, at 791 (noting that in Somalia “a civil war was sparked by efforts of opposition
groups to control the humanitarian food aid”); Peter Margulies, Accountable Altruism: The Impact of the
Federal Material Support Statute on Humanitarian Aid, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 539, 551 (2011)
(“[H]umanitarian aid is merely another resource, like so-called conflict diamonds, that triggers conflicts
between contending factions.”).
35 Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities, 71 Fed. Reg.
63,838, 63,847 (Oct. 31, 2006) (“[T]errorist abuse also includes the exploitation of charitable services and
activities to radicalize vulnerable populations and cultivate support for terrorist organizations and activities.”).
36 Elena Helmer & Stuart H. Deming, Non-Governmental Organizations: Anticorruption Compliance
Challenges and Risks, 45 INT’L LAW. 597, 611 (2011).
37 Bean, supra note 33, at 811.
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In the immediate aftermath of the Haitian earthquake, commentators and
development experts were anxious to turn the tragedy into an opportunity to
rebuild a stronger Haiti, one no longer dependent on foreign aid.38 In the relief
effort, however, U.S. anticorruption law had the paradoxical effect of both
discouraging much-needed corporate engagement and failing to capture
corruption. The situation in Haiti illustrates the challenge facing the FCPA to
adequately meet anticorruption goals and facilitate corporate charity.
Ultimately, a new legal framework must be considered if the United States
wishes to combat corruption and encourage corporate philanthropy abroad.
Current FCPA enforcement is both over-inclusive (discouraging bona fide
charity) and under-inclusive (failing to criminalize or capture some corrupt
activity). FCPA enforcement should be modified to create a “safe harbor
option,” giving corporations the option to earn a rebuttable presumption of
legitimacy for their donations by publically disclosing their payments, thus
ameliorating the over- and under-inclusive nature of the FCPA.
Part I of this Comment introduces the FCPA—a law focused on preventing
corruption abroad—and shows how this law fails to accommodate corporate
charity. Part II suggests modifications to the FCPA to create the safe harbor
option for disclosed corporate charity, while Part III lends support for the safe
harbor option by discussing the benefit of regulating by disclosure rather than
prohibition. Finally, Part IV extends this argument to conclude that regulatory
systems based on disclosure rather than prohibition will be most successful at
encouraging both anticorruption efforts as well as philanthropic goals.
I. THE FCPA AND CORPORATE CHARITY
The FCPA is the major law aimed at combating international bribery and
corruption. Section A introduces the FCPA and details the law’s major
provisions. Section B discusses the FCPA’s application to corporate charity
and details how the law is both under- and over-inclusive.

38 See supra note 7 (discussing Haiti’s “charity fatigue” and opportunities for long-term economic
development following the earthquake).
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A. The Law
The creation of the FCPA in the 1970s began the global movement against
corruption.39 When U.S. company Lockheed Corporation revealed it had paid
millions in bribes around the world,40 it became clear corporate bribery was
much more than a foreign ethics problem. Rather, it was a major policy issue
that strained U.S. alliances and threatened political interests around the
world.41 In Italy, the “sight of corrupt capitalism” strengthened the communist
movement.42 Japanese–U.S. relations also suffered as the scandal threatened to
“drive a wedge between two close allies.”43 The fallout from the Lockheed
scandal helped to provide impetus for the creation of the FCPA.44
The FCPA consists of two main provisions. The first is an accounting
requirement to help prevent corruption, and the second is an enforcement
mechanism to punish companies that have already engaged in bribery.45 The
accounting requirement, known as the books-and-records provision, requires
corporations to maintain sufficient internal controls and accounting standards
to prevent violations of the FCPA enforcement mechanism.46 The enforcement
mechanism, in turn, prohibits corruptly giving anything of value to a foreign
official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.47 The elements have
been interpreted expansively by prosecutors and courts and are set out briefly
below.

39

See DAVID KENNEDY & DAN DANIELSEN, BUSTING BRIBERY: SUSTAINING THE GLOBAL MOMENTUM
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 20–21 (2011) (noting the effect that the FCPA had on the global
anticorruption movement, creating momentum for agreements such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
the Council of Europe Convention on Corruption, and the UN Convention against Corruption).
40 Spalding, supra note 25, at 360.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 385 (quoting Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearing on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong. 173 (1977) (statement of Rep. Stephen S. Solarz)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 Id. (quoting Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin.
of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 141 (1976) (statement of Rep. Stephen S.
Solarz)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 See id. at 359–60 (discussing how the Lockheed scandal produced congressional hearings “almost
immediately” and alerted Congress to the “foreign policy problem” of U.S. bribery).
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
46 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2006).
47 Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence,
43 IND. L. REV. 389, 389–90 (2010); see 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. An affirmative defense to an FCPA charge is
available if the payment is: 1) explicitly legal under the host country’s laws, or 2) a reasonable business
expenditure made without corrupt intent. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1)–(2). There is also an exception for grease
payments to speed up routine, clerical government actions. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b).

OF THE
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– “Corruptly giving”: The FCPA is aimed at payments that are made
corruptly with “evil motive or purpose.”48
– “Anything of value”: In other criminal statutes, this phrase has been
interpreted broadly by courts; the FCPA is no exception.49 It can be
extended to gifts, travel expenses, scholarships, and even charitable
donations made in the name of an individual or to a cause that an
individual values.50
– “To a foreign official”: A foreign official is defined in the FCPA as
“any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof.”51 The term instrumentality was the
source of a great deal of confusion,52 but several recent court decisions
have offered multifactor definitions for the term.53 The factors include
considerations such as the foreign state’s characterization of the entity,
the purpose of the entity’s activities, and whether the entity derives
support from grants or a special tax status.54
– “For the purpose of obtaining or retaining business”: This term has
also been interpreted expansively and covers any activities that assist a

48

Stichting Ter Behartiging Van De Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l
B.V. v. S.E. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173, 182 (2d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 447–49
(5th Cir. 2007) (noting that “corruptly” was a fact-based question and that a jury did not need to find specific
intent to find that a defendant acted corruptly).
49 William Alan Nelson II, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Charitable Contributions and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act 9–10 (July 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884283; see also NFTC Criticizes Broadening FCPA Enforcement, Lawyers
Disagree, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 24, 2008, at 1, 22 [hereinafter NFTC Criticizes] (“[T]he company’s
contribution to the charity bestowed a benefit to the official because it enhanced his reputation . . . .”).
50 H. Lowell Brown, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Redux: The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 260, 273–75 (1994).
51 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f).
52 See generally Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS.
LAW. 1243 (2008) (suggesting the DOJ and SEC provide more guidance regarding who qualifies as a foreign
official under the FCPA).
53 Thomas R. Fox, Reading a Crystal Ball? Guidance on Instrumentality Under the FCPA–Part I, FCPA
COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (Aug. 17, 2011, 7:14 AM), http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/08/17/reading-acrystal-ball-guidance-on-instrumentality-under-the-fcpa-part-i/.
54 Id. Other factors cited include: the extent of the foreign state’s ownership or control over the entity or
its officers; the entity’s financing structure and whether support is derived from government appropriations or
fees; the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and if the entity is widely perceived to be performing
government functions. Id.
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company in obtaining business directly (such as winning contracts) or
indirectly (such as gaining lower taxes or import duties).55
The DOJ and SEC both have enforcement power over FCPA violations.56
B. Application to Corporate Philanthropy: Desirable Ambiguities?
This section discusses the shortcomings of U.S. anticorruption laws with
regard to charitable giving and demonstrates that the FCPA is both over- and
under-inclusive in the realm of corporate charity.
The FCPA has often been criticized for a lack of clarity,57 yet the DOJ and
SEC have declined to issue formal rules or guidelines until very recently.58
Some scholars have suggested that this lack of guidance stemmed from an
unwillingness to provide a “blueprint” for companies to circumvent the law.59
Many support this reasoning and believe that the inherent ambiguities in the
FCPA make it an effective law.60

55 United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 439–40 (5th Cir. 2007) (avoiding taxes); Lamb v. Phillip Morris,
Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1025 (6th Cir. 1990) (gaining changes in pricing controls and assurances regarding the tax
rate).
56 Koehler, supra note 47, at 395.
57 See, e.g., Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 497 (2011).
58 CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012). This guidance did not add any new
regulations or rules, however, and was intended to be “non-binding, informal, and summary in nature.” Id.
59 Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is to Be Done with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 461–62 (1987); see also Note, The Criminalization of American
Extraterritorial Bribery: The Effect of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 645, 654 & n.67 (1981) (discussing how, at the FCPA’s inception, the SEC asked why they should “issue
guidelines on how to violate the law” and DOJ officials likewise refused to tell businesses “who they can bribe
and who they can’t”). But see Rebecca Koch, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It’s Time to Cut Back
the Grease and Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 400–01 (2005) (arguing that the
DOJ did not issue guidelines because the nature of the FCPA made it impossible to write effective guidance).
60 See Letter from Civil Society Organizations to Members of the U.S. House of Representatives (Jan.
12, 2012), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/FCPA%20Letter.pdf (“We believe that
any amendments to more narrowly define key terms of the FCPA would . . . significantly undermine the statute
as a tool to curb corruption.”). But see Westbrook, supra note 57, at 498 (arguing that the FCPA’s ambiguities
“frustrate its purpose”). There has been a recent push, spearheaded by the Chamber of Commerce, to amend
the FCPA in a variety of ways. See ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 6
(2010). These efforts have largely been suspended following a well-publicized bribery scandal of one of the
Chamber’s major donors, Wal-Mart. Peter J. Henning, Taking Aim at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 30, 2012, 1:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/taking-aim-at-theforeign-corrupt-practices-act/.
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While formal rules are lacking, the DOJ does have an “opinion release
procedure” to provide guidance.61 Through this process, companies submit
details of their business situations or contracts—hypotheticals are not
permitted—and the DOJ publishes its opinion regarding any possible FCPA
issues.62 If the company follows the DOJ’s advice, the activity is presumed to
be FCPA compliant.63 This opinion release procedure, however, has been used
only a few times each year since its inception.64
Five of the last thirty FCPA opinion releases focus on charitable activity,
demonstrating corporations’ concerns about how the FCPA applies to
philanthropy.65 Although the DOJ may believe that ambiguity is a desirable
trait in the FCPA, there is evidence that it is willing to offer extra guidance for
philanthropic activities. In an effort to provide clarity to the area, the DOJ
included a best practices guide for international charity in a 2010 opinion.66
This guide instructs donors to:
1) obtain certification from the recipient regarding an understanding of the
FCPA;
2) perform due diligence to confirm that none of the recipient’s officers are
affiliated with the foreign government;
3) obtain audited financial statements from the recipient;
4) ensure the funds are transferred to a valid bank account;
5) confirm that the activities planned occur prior to disbursal of funds; and

6) continue to monitor the program.67
Despite the DOJ publications, confusion remains regarding the scope of the
FCPA and charitable giving.68

61

See Longobardi, supra note 59, at 461–65, for a detailed discussion of the opinion release procedure.
See id. at 462–63. In the publications, all identifiers or specific details about the company, contract, or
operating country are removed. Id.
63 28 C.F.R. § 80.10 (2012).
64 Longobardi, supra note 59, at 465. See generally Opinion Procedure Releases, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2013).
65 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 10-02, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE (2010); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NO. 09-01, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE (2009); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 06-01, OPINION PROCEDURE
RELEASE (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 97-02, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE (2002); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NO. 95-01, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE (1995). For an in-depth analysis of these opinions, see
Nelson, supra note 49, at 22–32.
66 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 10-02, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE 6 (2010).
67 Id.
68 Westbrook, supra note 57, at 539.
62
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Compounding this confusion is a lack of relevant caselaw.69 There has been
only one instance of a successful FCPA investigation and settlement regarding
illicit charitable donations.70 In 2004, the SEC settled with U.S.-based
pharmaceutical company Schering-Plough (SP) for violations of the booksand-records provision.71 SP paid $500,000 in fines72 for the improper recording
of about $75,000 in donations made by SP’s Polish subsidiary to a Polish nonprofit.73
In the complaint, the SEC enumerated several factors that should have
alerted SP that its accounting records were insufficient to protect against
“FCPA issues,” including the facts that:
1) SP’s corporate charity focus was on healthcare issues, but the Polish
non-profit was dedicated to the restoration of castles;
2) the donations to the charity represented an unusually high percentage of
the total charitable gifts made by SP Poland during the time period;
3) most of the payments were carefully structured so the dollar amount did
not exceed the local manager’s authorization level; and

69 Id. at 497, 539. This complaint regarding the FCPA is not unique to the area of corporate charity. The
wide majority of FCPA cases settle without going to trial, and the resulting deferred- or non-prosecution
agreements are not subject to judicial scrutiny and are not considered binding precedent. Mike Koehler, The
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 998–1001 (2010) (discussing “[t]he [a]bsurdity of
FCPA ‘[c]ase [l]aw’”). Despite the paucity of FCPA actions actually brought, potential penalty costs are
dwarfed by the amount that a company must expend to investigate possible abuses. Russell G. Ryan & Laura
K. Bennett, Seven Common False Comforts and Misconceptions About FCPA Risk, 26 Corp. Couns. Wkly.
(BNA) 389 (Dec. 21, 2011) (noting that a company that ultimately paid a $300,000 FCPA penalty also
expended $2.5 million to investigate the violations); see also Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown on
Bribery Hurts Business and Enriches Insiders, FORBES, May 24, 2010, at 70 (noting that Siemens is reported
to have spent nearly $1 billion on legal and accounting analysis to review its transactions before and during the
major FCPA prosecution).
70 In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 49,838, 82 SEC Docket 3644 (June 9, 2004);
see also John P. Giraudo, Charitable Contributions and the FCPA: Schering-Plough and the Increasing Scope
of SEC Enforcement, 61 BUS. LAW. 135, 147–54 (2005). One FCPA case focused on charitable giving did
reach the court system, but it was dismissed because the court found that the FCPA did not allow for a private
right of action. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1027–30 (6th Cir. 1990). In this case, a U.S.
tobacco company’s foreign subsidiary entered into a contract with the Children’s Foundation of Caracas. Id. at
1025. This agreement, signed on behalf of the foundation by the wife of the President of Venezuela, set forth
that in exchange for a $12.5 million donation, the company would gain price controls and tax assurances in
Venezuela’s tobacco market. Id.
71 See In re Schering-Plough, 82 SEC Docket at 3644–45.
72 Id. at 3644 n.1.
73 Id. at 3645.
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4) the director and founder of the charity was also a Polish government
official responsible for purchasing healthcare products for his region of
Poland.74
The SEC also highlighted the fact that the SP manager reported viewing the
payments as “dues” required for the government official’s cooperation.75
Ultimately, SP only faced fines for violations of the books-and-records
requirement, not for violations of the substantive antibribery enforcement
mechanism.76 This is possibly because the element of the crime requiring a
knowing or willful violation failed to transfer from the Polish SP subsidiary to
U.S.-based SP.77
The SP investigation and settlement came as a surprise to many,78 despite
the historical precedent of considering charitable contributions to be something
of “value.”79 The settlement created confusion in companies’ compliance
programs because SP’s donations were made to a recognized Polish charity
and the Polish foreign official enjoyed no personal financial gain.80 This
seemed to contradict a 2009 DOJ opinion release stating that a corporation was
allowed to donate medical devices to foreign, state-run hospitals because the
gifts were not directed to foreign officials, but rather to foreign
instrumentalities, the hospitals.81 Despite the confusion, commentators did

74

Complaint at 5, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 1:04CV00945 (D.D.C. June 9, 2004).
Id. at 4. This is similar to the recent exposé regarding Wal-Mart’s Mexican subsidiary’s FCPA
violations. In that case, Wal-Mart de Mexico was revealed to have paid almost $16 million directly to local
governments in Mexico to obtain licenses or building permits—many of these payments were labeled as
“donations” in the company records. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After
Top-Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at A1.
76 Giraudo, supra note 70, at 150–51.
77 Id. Currently, the SEC is investigating donations made by Wynn Resorts Limited, which may
implicate FCPA issues. Wynn Resorts $135 Million University of Macau Donation the Subject of SEC
Scrutiny, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/wynn-resorts-whopping-135million-university-of-macau-donation-the-subject-of-sec-scrutiny.
78 See, e.g., Giraudo, supra note 70, at 154; Martin J. Weinstein & Robert J. Meyer, SEC Finds
Donations to Bona Fide Charity to Be in Violation of the FCPA, in CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW UPDATE
579, 580 (PLI N.Y. Practice Skills, Course Handbook Ser. No. 3377, 2004).
79 See, e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1027 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd1(a), -2(a)); accord Brown, supra note 50, at 273–75.
80 Giraudo, supra note 70, at 151 (noting the donations were made directly to the charity); see also
Weinstein & Meyer, supra note 78, at 580 (noting that the “expansive” new enforcement actions of the SEC
could “render promotional charitable donations a criminal violation of the FCPA, even though such payments
traditionally have withstood scrutiny”).
81 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 09-01, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE (2009); see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NO. 97-02, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE (1997) (declining to prosecute a company that was
75
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agree that the SEC investigation indicated that corporate charity was fair game
for FCPA investigations.82 Some commentators have even predicted that the
DOJ and SEC might affirmatively target charity programs for potential FCPA
abuses.83
These ambiguities in the law are particularly troublesome for corporations
that hope to make charitable contributions in their host communities abroad,
and they have resulted in both over- and under-inclusive results when the
FCPA is applied to corporate charity.
1. Over-Inclusivity
Compliance advice—released by the DOJ or designed by commentators—
tends to envision a much broader interpretation of the FCPA than the language
of the statute suggests.84 These opinions recommend a total prohibition against
any charitable gifts to any organization with connections to foreign officials or
their families.85 The FCPA, however, does not criminalize giving anything to
foreign officials, but rather giving gifts to foreign officials corruptly (with the
ill-intent expectation of quid pro quo).86 This guidance suggests that
corporations may be exposing themselves to liability if they make donations to
organizations connected to foreign officials. For a prudent, philanthropic
company following these guidelines, the pool of possible charity recipients
would seem to be limited to organizations that are 1) private, and 2) lacking in
any connection to a government official.87 Furthermore, identifying “foreign
officials” is considerably more difficult in the charitable realm than in
traditional business decisions. Many factors used in recent judicial decisions to
define “government entities” might apply de facto to non-profit organizations,
such as “the purpose of the entity’s activities,” or if the entity is granted

planning donations to a local school, because the donations were going to a government entity (the school)
rather than foreign officials); Nelson, supra note 49, at 35–36.
82 Giraudo, supra note 70, at 152; Weinstein & Meyer, supra note 78, at 580.
83 See, e.g., Helmer & Deming, supra note 36, at 623–24 (predicting that internationally focused NGOs
and aid organizations, especially “NGOs that are not fundamentally of a charitable nature, and that compete
with more traditional business organizations,” might become the focus of FCPA scrutiny).
84 See Koehler, supra note 69, at 1001 (“[B]usinesses . . . model FCPA compliance policies . . . not on
what the law actually says, but rather on what the enforcement agencies say the law says . . . .”); Nelson, supra
note 49, at 48–58. See generally supra note 65.
85 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 10-02, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE (2010).
86 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006); see supra text accompanying note 48.
87 However, this may be difficult because, as Nelson notes, “many foreign aid organizations have ties to
foreign governments.” Nelson, supra note 49, at 40.
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“special tax treatment.”88 Such an expansive, ambiguous application of the
FCPA runs the serious risk of chilling even honest corporate charity
programs.89
Commentators have long argued that the FCPA has a negative impact on
U.S. business abroad, although empirical evidence of such claims is
inconclusive.90 However, it is possible that any chilling impact the FCPA
might have on business may be exacerbated in the realm of corporate charity:
in for-profit business arrangements, the corporation might count on its profit to
offset FCPA risks.91 Such a profit offset is unlikely to exist in a charity project,
at least to the extent necessary to offset the potential costs of an FCPA
investigation. Corporations may try to minimize their risk by directing
corporate aid away from “high-risk,” corrupt countries.92 This could cause
unintended collateral damage by creating de facto sanctions that isolate the
least developed, neediest communities from corporate charity.93 By
discouraging corporate aid, the United States risks not only exacerbating
poverty, but also squandering the opportunity for global leadership.94
2. Under-Inclusivity
FCPA enforcement also fails to criminalize and punish some forms of
charitable donations that could be considered corrupt.

88

See Fox, supra note 53.
NFTC Criticizes, supra note 49. See generally Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83
IND. L.J. 1035, 1044–72 (2008) (arguing that the enforcement of many corporate criminal statutes causes
companies to “overpay” for compliance programs and avoid otherwise lucrative investments or other
opportunities).
90 See Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 90–91 (2007) (discussing the contradictory reports on the effect that the FCPA has
on U.S. business). Compare WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 5 (arguing that the FCPA has had a
negative effect on U.S. business interests), with Susan Rose-Ackerman & Sinéad Hunt, Transparency and
Business Advantage: The Impact of International Anti-Corruption Policies on the United States National
Interest, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 433, 433 (2012) (arguing that the negative impact of the FCPA and
other anticorruption laws has been overstated).
91 Brandon L. Garrett, Don’t Believe the Hype on Corporate Bribery, HUFFINGTON POST (May 2, 2012,
8:52 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brandon-l-garrett/dont-believe-the-hype-on-_b_1470363.html
(suggesting that FCPA fines and costs “may be fairly trivial in comparison to the corporate profits”).
92 Nelson, supra note 49, at 39 (“The amount of corruption in a country can affect a company’s
willingness to make charitable contributions in that country.”).
93 See Spalding, supra note 25, at 398.
94 Margulies, supra note 34, at 543 (discussing counterterrorism policy and its chilling effect on U.S.
donations abroad).
89
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For example, some corporate donations appear to be attempts to “buy off”
host communities to create a favorable working environment.95 Consider Shell
Oil Company in Nigeria, which has been criticized for creating development
projects only in communities adjacent to pipeline construction, and then
abandoning the projects immediately when the pipelines are complete and the
villagers’ goodwill is no longer needed.96 As another example, Shell “built
three town halls in one Niger Delta community as three community chiefs
wanted to benefit personally from contracts for their construction.”97 From the
facts available, it appears Shell’s actions would not implicate any FCPA
issues: no government official benefited from the donations even though such
activities seem corrupt.
Furthermore, it may be possible for unscrupulous corporations to escape
FCPA liability if they funnel donations through charities that are independent
from foreign officials. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which a corporation
seeks business opportunities from a foreign official in exchange for
development projects that increase the official’s popularity in a key electoral
area.98 Even though such an exchange “undermine[s] . . . inherent fairness”99
and provides a foreign official with something of value—here, increased
prestige in an electoral district—because the funds are dedicated to a town or
area rather than a government official, it is possible no FCPA violations would
occur.100
II. FCPA SAFE HARBOR OPTION: A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY
FOR PROPERLY DISCLOSED CHARITY

This Part explores solutions that will allow anticorruption laws to operate
more effectively in the realm of corporate philanthropy. It introduces the safe
harbor option, a modification to the FCPA that gives corporations the option of
“buying” a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy for their donations in return
for full disclosure of these payments.
95

Frynas, supra note 13, at 584–85; Sprinkle & Maines, supra note 9, at 446–48.
Frynas, supra note 13, at 584–85.
97 Id. at 585.
98 See Juscelino F. Colares, The Evolving Domestic and International Law Against Foreign Corruption:
Some New and Old Dilemmas Facing the International Lawyer, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 26–29
(2006).
99 Id. at 29.
100 Id. at 26–29; Nelson, supra note 49, at 35 (discussing the DOJ opinion releases and noting that the
opinions “are troublesome in that they seem to give companies room to circumvent the FCPA” through
scenarios such as the one discussed here); Rose-Ackerman & Hunt, supra note 90, at 444 n.64.
96
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To ameliorate the over- and under-inclusive nature of the FCPA’s treatment
of corporate charity, an optional disclosure-based program should be enacted.
The safe harbor option proposed by this Comment will incentivize
transparency and decrease corruption by allowing for public shaming of
companies engaging in corrupt philanthropy. The rebuttable presumption of
legitimacy, awarded to corporations participating in the safe harbor option, will
ease some of the concerns corporations may have regarding the scope of the
FCPA and potential liability stemming from charitable donations.101
Although the SEC and DOJ seem to view self-disclosure of FCPA
violations favorably in the process of investigation and potential
prosecution,102 such disclosures provide little assurance to companies because
any prosecutorial mercy is purely discretionary.103 The safe harbor option will
function very differently as an optional program that requires disclosure of all
corporate charity, not merely donations a company later discovers to be FCPA
violations.
If a company participates in the safe harbor option, they would be required
to file annual reports disclosing charitable donations. These disclosures would
be made to a neutral organization or government agency.104 A new commission
or board within the agency would be created to monitor the corporate
philanthropy disclosures.105 The amount of the donation, the project, purpose,
101

For a similar recommendation for charitable and non-profit organizations regarding the application of
the laws against providing funding to a terrorist organization, see Margulies, supra note 34, at 545, which
recommended a solution that combines a “safe harbor” and an “expanded waiver” that produces a “dual
approach [that] encourage[s] due diligence on the part of aid groups, while avoiding an undue burden on
humanitarian efforts.”
102 See KENNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 39, at 29 (arguing that a statutory defense for “compliance” is
unnecessary since the DOJ and SEC already take the presence of compliance programs and efforts into
account when bringing a case).
103 Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
609, 650 (discussing the “opaque, inconsistent, and unpredictable world of DOJ decisionmaking”). This is
further complicated by the fact that disclosure of some FCPA violations to the SEC may open the company up
to prosecution by other government agencies, such as the DOJ or the IRS. George Clarke & Lina Braude,
More Sticky Strands in the FCPA Web: Tax Rules and Financial Reporting May Drive Disclosure, 42 INT’L
LAW. 1095, 1095–96 (2008).
104 Possible organizations include the Export-Import Bank or Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
Cf. Daniel M. Firger, Note, Transparency and the Natural Resource Curse: Examining the New
Extraterritorial Information Forcing Rules in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, 41 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 1043, 1093 (2010).
105 Other authors have suggested similar commissions or federal agencies to monitor charitable activity
within the United States. See Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector
Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 8 (2009) (advocating “the
creation of a federal quasi-public agency to serve as the principal regulator of the charitable sector”); Lloyd

PISANO GALLEYSPROOFS1

3/5/2013 11:40 AM

2013] THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND CORPORATE CHARITY

623

beneficiaries, and any affiliated organizations would be disclosed.106 Such a
disclosure and tracking system should not be too difficult or expensive to
provide.107 The system should be Internet-based, fully searchable,108 and, most
importantly, easy to use and accessible to readers.109 The disclosure system
should make information easily and readily available to NGOs, watchdog
groups, and interested citizens.110
Such systems have already been suggested and implemented to track aid
flows in response to major disasters. The United Nations, with assistance from
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, used an online disclosure system to track the
donations that were given in response to the 2004 tsunami in Asia.111 This
system, however, was not mandatory, and the information provided was
incomplete112 because “the information [was] only as complete as the various
governments’ willingness to report the information.”113
With the FCPA safe harbor option, corporations would have a much greater
incentive to provide accurate and complete information: a rebuttable
presumption of legitimacy for their donations. This presumption would be
awarded to companies that accurately disclose their charitable contributions

Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An Institutional
Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 498–501 (2010) (citing a variety of proposals recommending the
creation of a federal commission to monitor domestic non-profits).
106 For an example of a possible disclosure form for corporate social responsibility, see Cynthia A.
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1197, 1299–300, app. at 1307–11 (1999).
107 Michael Wiehen, Needs Assessment, Contracting, and Execution, in CURBING CORRUPTION IN
TSUNAMI RELIEF OPERATIONS 49, 49 (2005) [hereinafter TSUNAMI RELIEF OPERATIONS]. But see William V.
Luneburg & Thomas M. Susman, Lobbying Disclosure: A Recipe for Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 32, 54–55 (2006)
(discussing the difficulties that the Senate and House had in creating a glitch-free and functioning Internetbased program to publicize disclosures).
108 Luneburg & Susman, supra note 107, at 55 (recommending the use of a system that allowed for
“immediate posting on the Internet and full-text searches as well as searches by category”); Elisabeth Bassett,
Comment, Reform Through Exposure, 57 EMORY L.J. 1049, 1082 (2008).
109 See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, on Disclosure
and Simplification as Regulatory Tools 7 (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf.
110 See TSUNAMI RELIEF OPERATIONS, supra note 107, at 4. For further discussion of the potential role of
NGOs and watchdog groups, see infra text accompanying notes 159–63.
111 Jak Jabes, Improving the Transparency of Aid Flows, in TSUNAMI RELIEF OPERATIONS, supra note
107, at 13, 14.
112 See id.
113 RHODA MARGESSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32715, INDIAN OCEAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI:
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND RELIEF OPERATIONS 21 n.41 (2005).
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through the online tracking system,114 subject only to minimal monitoring by
the newly created board or commission.115 The legitimacy presumption should
be considered rebutted if the new board finds clear and convincing evidence,
whether from an outside watchdog report or through its own monitoring
process, that the information disclosed was not accurate or aid given was not
actually intended as a charitable donation.
Drawing examples from the scenarios discussed above, the facts of the
Schering-Plough settlement116 would rebut this presumption because the
“donations” were actually considered “dues” paid to gain cooperation of a
foreign official.117 Alternatively, Chevron’s donations in Angola might not
rebut the presumption of legitimacy because it appears, at least from the
information available, that the payments were made as donations, not as dues
to the government.118
If the new monitoring board finds clear and convincing evidence to rebut
the presumption of legitimacy, it would then pass the case on to the DOJ or to
the SEC for traditional investigation or enforcement.119 If corporations choose
not to disclose their payments, their payments would remain open to traditional
FCPA investigation and enforcement action.
III. REGULATING BY DISCLOSURE
This Part explores the benefits of creating a safe harbor option within the
FCPA enforcement regime that would incentivize disclosure by granting
corporate philanthropy a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy. This Part
discusses the specific regulatory benefits of the safe harbor option and how it

114

This is similar to how the DOJ currently views situations that have been sanctioned through the
opinion release procedure. See supra note 63. If a company follows advice and guidance given by the DOJ in
response to the corporation’s opinion request, the activity is presumed to be in compliance with the FCPA. If
the information provided to the DOJ is not accurate or complete, the presumption will be rebutted. 28 C.F.R.
§ 80.10 (2012).
115 The creation of commissions or boards to monitor charitable activity has been suggested by a number
of commentators. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
116 For a discussion of the Schering-Plough case, see supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
117 Complaint at 4, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 1:04CV00945 (D.D.C. June 9, 2004).
118 See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. The Angola payments, however, may still deserve
public scrutiny or criticism, which will be facilitated if Chevron properly discloses the details of these
transactions. See infra Part III.B.
119 Cf. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 273 (2003)
(suggesting that, in this situation, a commission should pass the case on to the Assistant Attorney General).
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would ameliorate both the over- and under-inclusive aspects of the FCPA’s
treatment of corporate charity.120
This Part discusses why the safe harbor option proposed by this Comment
is an important addition to how the FCPA is enforced against corruption in
corporate charity. It shows how the safe harbor option would ameliorate the
over-inclusive effects of the FCPA by offering the presumption of legitimacy
and by relying on disclosure rather than strict prohibition. The safe harbor
option would also ameliorate the under-inclusive nature of the FCPA by
encouraging disclosure and allowing for public monitoring of both legal and
illegal corporate charity.
A. Ameliorate FCPA’s Over-Inclusivity
The safe harbor option would offer corporations the opportunity to gain a
rebuttable presumption of legitimacy for their charitable donations. This
presumption would ease FCPA liability concerns that might otherwise
discourage charity. Unlike current FCPA compliance, which focuses on strict
prohibition (i.e., “confirm that none of the recipient’s officers [are] affiliated
with the foreign government”),121 the safe harbor option would encourage
regulation of charity through disclosure.
The traditional, prohibition-based enforcement of the FCPA should be
updated because such systems are “limited in their ability to regulate
corporations’ sustainable economic development.”122 A disclosure-based (or
“information-based”) system is often seen as a “second generation” regulatory
strategy that is useful for updating older, prohibition-based systems.123 The
FCPA, like many major regulations, was created in the 1970s and relies on
“command-and-control,” or a prohibitive system of regulation.124 Such systems

120 For a general introduction to regulatory systems that rely on disclosure, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618–29
(1999).
121 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 10-02, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE 6 (2010); supra text
accompanying note 66.
122 See David Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier of
Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 221, 263 (2007).
123 Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 21–23
(2001); accord Katherine Renshaw, Student Article, Sounding Alarms: Does Informational Regulation Help or
Hinder Environmentalism?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 654, 663 (2006).
124 See Stewart, supra note 123, at 21–23.
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can have a chilling effect on the activity regulated,125 just as the FCPA has
caused corporations to hesitate before donating abroad.126 Disclosure-based
regulations are more flexible than strict prohibitions and “incorporate . . . basic
economic and social changes” with greater ease than prohibitive systems.127
Such flexibility and inclusiveness is especially desirable for charitable
programs, which may need to change quickly based on a company’s evolving
social goals or in response to a sudden humanitarian disaster.128
The safe harbor option grants corporations the ability to choose the
regulatory program that makes the best economic sense for their company.129
The current cost of FCPA compliance causes considerable dismay in the
business community130: even “relatively small” FCPA penalties are in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars131 and may be accompanied by millions of
dollars in investigation and compliance fees.132 However, an alternative,
disclosure-based system has also been criticized for its cost: at the creation of
the FCPA, Congress rejected a form of the law based on disclosure because of
concerns regarding the high costs and paperwork requirements.133 Within the
narrow realm of corporate charity, however, costs of disclosure are likely to be
much lower, perhaps in part because many corporations already disclose
charitable information directly to shareholders or to the “popular
media . . . where public relations benefits are anticipated.”134
125 This phenomenon has been observed in the enforcement of many corporate criminal statutes that cause
companies to “overpay” for compliance and avoid other opportunities. Baer, supra note 89. Disclosure-based
systems, on the other hand, reduce the cost of potential deviation and provide more producer flexibility.
Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92
HARV. L. REV. 547, 580 (1979).
126 See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
127 Stewart, supra note 123, at 130 (discussing how environmental regulations that are based on disclosure
or information are more flexible than traditional control-style laws).
128 This will be discussed further in Part IV.B. See infra text accompanying note 201.
129 The factors and considerations that already go into a company’s decision to voluntarily disclose FCPA
matters are numerous. Lucinda A. Low et al., The Uncertain Calculus of FCPA Voluntary Disclosures 9–11
(Mar. 27, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/spring07/World%
20Bank%20Anticorruption%20Programs/Low%20-%20The%20Uncertain%20Calculus%20of%20FCPA%20
Voluntary%20Disclosures.pdf.
130 See generally WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 60.
131 Ryan & Bennett, supra note 69, at 2.
132 WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 60, at 5 (discussing the impact of current FCPA costs on U.S.
companies).
133 Koehler, supra note 47, at 419–20.
134 Kahn, supra note 12, at 583; see also Comments from Nat’l Mining Ass’n to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proposed Rule Implementing Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act 10 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-4210/s74210-45.pdf (“Such payments typically will be covered by the voluntary sustainable development reports
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It is crucial that the safe harbor option would remain optional, regardless of
which regulatory system is theoretically more expensive.135 There are other
factors, beside compliance costs, which may influence a company’s
preferences regarding disclosure. If a corporation donates to an unpopular
cause in the foreign country, it may face retribution if its support becomes
public. Even in the United States, it is not unheard of for some corporate
support, such as funding for Planned Parenthood, to anger customers who
support alternative goals.136 The Supreme Court has recognized the importance
of allowing advocates of unpopular causes to remain anonymous137 and even
disclosure requirements for U.S. non-profits include special procedures when
charities might “be the target of harassment campaigns.”138
Just as engaging in philanthropic activity is a choice that individual
companies make, it is important that participation in the safe harbor option also
remains a choice for it to adequately address the FCPA’s over-inclusive
treatment of corporate charity.
B. Ameliorate FCPA’s Under-Inclusivity
Putting a greater emphasis on disclosure through the safe harbor option
would also help punish corrupt activity that the current FCPA fails to
criminalize or capture. The presumption of legitimacy would encourage and
reward disclosure, which would in turn allow civil society to monitor corporate
donations, even if the payments are not illegal under the FCPA.139
As a second-generation regulatory structure, disclosure-based systems
allow civil society to participate in the regulatory process to a greater extent

in any event.”); Low et al., supra note 129, at 6–8 (discussing a variety of other laws, besides the FCPA, which
might mandate disclosure).
135 ANNA PETERS & DANIELA RÖß, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN PROMOTING CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT 17 (2010) (discussing the benefits of
“soft law” and the “importance of voluntarism in the [corporate responsibility] agenda”).
136 See Marianne M. Jennings & Jon Entine, Business with a Soul: A Reexamination of What Counts in
Business Ethics, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 35 (1998); Rene Lynch, Susan G. Komen’s Reversal: What
Does It Really Mean?, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012, 10:22 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2012/
02/susan-g-komen-planned-parenthood-reversal.html.
137 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (“The decision in favor of
anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism,
or . . . to preserve . . . privacy . . . .”).
138 Fishman, supra note 119, at 271.
139 Sunstein, supra note 120, at 625 (discussing how informational regulation encourages citizens to
engage in oversight and promotes “[a] well-functioning system of deliberative democracy”).
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than a centrally controlled prohibitive system of regulation.140 Accordingly, the
safe harbor option would empower NGOs, watchdog groups, and journalists to
monitor corporate donations, legal or illegal.141 Disclosure-based systems rely
upon the weight of public opinion to judge corporate action,142 and, because
“[c]orporations depend on goodwill of clients and customers,” reputational
harm can have far greater repercussions for businesses than governmentimposed fines.143 However, these programs are only successful if a company’s
transgressions provoke sufficient public outrage.144 For example, public
backlash against corporate misbehavior can sometimes be less robust if a
corporation has harmed an unrelated third party, as opposed to a customer or
business partner.145 Commentators question whether customers buying a
Siemens kitchen appliance, for example, would actually be “troubled by the
payment of bribes in a third world development project.”146
The strength of consumer interest in ethical business belies these concerns.
The amount of consumer spending dedicated to supporting ethical and
sustainable businesses is estimated at close to $300 billion per year.147
Furthermore, corporations are certainly sensitive to how the public perceives
their company ethics—this is the very reason why some corporations engage in

140 See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing second-generation regulations). Not only will
the disclosure system allow civil society to monitor corporate donations, as this section discusses, but it may
also allow the public to monitor how the government itself chooses to enforce the FCPA. Current DOJ and
SEC interpretations of the FCPA and enforcement actions have been roundly criticized by many
commentators. E.g., Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New
Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 117 (2011). Furthermore, the majority of FCPA cases are resolved through
deferred- (DPA) or non-prosecution agreements (NPA), both of which can be characterized as a series of
“privately negotiated agreements.” Koehler, supra note 69, at 934. This may be of special public interest given
the tendency of companies that agree to a DPA or an NPA to still be awarded lucrative government contracts.
Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775,
804 (2011).
141 Cf. Luneburg & Susman, supra note 107, at 34 (discussing how disclosure-based lobbying laws have
had a similar impact); Sunstein, supra note 120, at 625.
142 David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1821–22 (2001); Sunstein,
supra note 120, at 625.
143 Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1851 (2011).
144 See Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence,
42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 489 (1999).
145 Id. at 490.
146 Garrett, supra note 143, at 1790. The Siemens FCPA enforcement investigation uncovered more than
$1.4 billion in bribes paid around the world, and the company paid $800 million in fines in the United States
alone. Id. at 1785–86.
147 Maurie J. Cohen, Consumer Credit, Household Financial Management, and Sustainable Consumption,
31 INT’L J. CONSUMER STUD. 57, 63 (2007); see Larry Dossey, LOHAS Market Size, LOHAS J., Spring 2010,
at 16, 16, available at http://www.lohas.com/sites/default/files/lohasmarketsize.pdf.
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philanthropy in the first place.148 Corporations often advertise their
contributions “where public relations benefits are anticipated,” but are unlikely
to advertise “gifts that might appear self-serving or prove controversial.”149 If
reports of a company bribing or hiding corruption in charity came to light, the
ethical reputation of that company would certainly be negatively impacted.
Alternatively, a greater accounting of a corporation’s social engagement would
no doubt benefit the company.150 And the company’s willingness to disclose in
the first place would tell the public “that the company has nothing to hide” and
“speak[] loudly of the firm’s integrity.”151
This focus on ethical, sustainable business is not only of interest to
consumers. Socially responsible investment groups, which evaluate investment
opportunities based on criteria such as corporate governance and community
engagement, will no doubt be interested in greater information regarding
corporate activity and philanthropy abroad.152 Investment portfolios that focus
on socially responsible investing have grown from $639 billion in 1995 to over
$3 trillion in 2010.153 Even investors who do not focus specifically on ethical
concerns are likely to be interested in the disclosures, especially since “today’s
social issue is tomorrow’s financial issue.”154 This connection is especially
clear in FCPA matters because FCPA enforcement actions against companies
are often followed by shareholder derivative suits and securities litigation.155
Thus, even though the companies might be acting—and bribing—in a foreign
country, the effects of the corporate activities and any subsequent public
backlash will be felt by investors within the United States, demonstrating the
148

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Kahn, supra note 12, at 583.
150 Sprinkle & Maines, supra note 9, at 449–52 (enumerating the various benefits of a company’s social
responsibility activities).
151 Jane Heath, Comment, Who’s Minding the Nonprofit Store: Does Sarbanes-Oxley Have Anything to
Offer Nonprofits?, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 781, 806 (2004).
152 For a general discussion of socially responsible investing, see Williams, supra note 106, at 1273–300.
153 SOC. INV. FORUM FOUND., 2010 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES 8 (2010), available at http://ussif.org/resources/research/documents/2010TrendsES.pdf. But
see Maura O’Neill, The Hunt for Impact Investments: Are Philanthropists Key?, U.S. DEPARTMENT ST.
DIPNOTE (Apr. 26, 2012), http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/are_philanthropists_key (citing a figure
from JP Morgan that “estimated that the potential capital market for impact investing—putting dollars into
enterprises that would deliver positive social impact—was between $400 billion and $1 trillion”). Twenty
trillion dollars in worldwide assets are managed by companies that have signed the UN’s Principles for
Responsible Investment. PETERS & RÖß, supra note 135, at 18. But see Firger, supra note 104, at 1078 (arguing
that social investments are of no concern to investors).
154 Williams, supra note 106, at 1284.
155 RAYMUND WONG & PATRICK CONROY, FCPA SETTLEMENTS: IT’S A SMALL WORLD AFTER ALL 7–9
(2009) (discussing the variety of lawsuits that have grown out of FCPA violations).
149
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interest that even purely economic investors might have in a corporation’s
philanthropy disclosures.156
This interest in socially responsible investing also counters another
common criticism of disclosure-based monitoring: that monitoring efforts will
be lax due to non-profit funding constraints or a selective monitoring focus on
exposé-type corruption stories.157 However, even cash-starved non-profits can
expand the reach and scope of their missions and publications through social
media programs or viral videos.158 Furthermore, non-profit organizations are
not the only groups interested in corporate charity disclosures. Socially
responsible investment firms will be likely to evaluate improper payments
disclosed by companies without focusing solely on the sensational. In addition,
for-profit newspapers often use disclosures as sources of news stories.159
Corporate governance issues are also often favorite topics of business-focused
publications, which often cover recent scandals and reach a highly educated
community of potential investors and business partners.160
Journalists and watchdog groups play another important role in a
disclosure-based system by digesting and distilling the released information.161
These groups can help the public understand what the released information
means. Disclosure-based systems often run the risk of ineffectiveness because
the information released is “data-rich but information-poor,” confusing, and
156

See id. at 8–11. As another example, when the New York Times published an exposé on Wal-Mart’s
Mexican subsidiary’s FCPA violations, Wal-Mart stocks experienced a market cap loss of $16 billion. Thomas
Kase, Walmart, Mexico, FCPA and Cultural Sensitivity (No, Not the Politically Correct Sort), SPEND
MATTERS (Apr. 27, 2012, 3:34 AM), http://www.spendmatters.com/index.cfm/2012/4/27/Walmart-MexicoFCPA-and-Cultural-Sensitivity-No-Not-the-Politically-Correct-Sort. The report also spurred a variety of other
setbacks for the company, including delays on U.S. building permits, delayed land deals, and formal audits.
Stephanie Clifford & Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart’s U.S. Expansion Plans Complicated by Bribery Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2012, at B1.
157 Skeel, supra note 142, at 1840–41; Firger, supra note 104, at 1086–87.
158 Allison Fine, It’s Time to Get Serious About Using Social Media, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 25,
2011, at 32.
159 See Jennifer Lynn Bell, Terrorist Abuse of Non-Profits and Charities: A Proactive Approach to
Preventing Terrorist Financing, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 450, 467 (2008) (noting that state attorneys
general, for example, often do not investigate domestic charitable trusts unless newspapers have first reported
wrongdoings); Luneburg & Susman, supra note 107, at 34.
160 See Skeel, supra note 142, at 1844 (discussing the impact and investor criticism resulting from
investigative reports and exposés published in Business Week and Fortune).
161 Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 119 (2010) (listing several NGOs that “serve as watchdogs to report corruption”);
Luneburg & Susman, supra note 107, at 34 (discussing how a civil society organization captured the disclosed
information and “published that information in an Internet-accessible database, allowing searches that easily
reveal important aspects of federal lobbying activity”).
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ultimately useless to consumers.162 However, this phenomenon is likely most
prominent in the disclosure of scientific or “highly technical” information,163
and released data about corporate charity projects are not likely to implicate
the same issues as complex scientific data.
Finally, including civil society in the monitoring of disclosed corporate
donations will alleviate many of the burdens that current FCPA monitoring
places on government investigators.164 The discussion above mentioned the
costs of FCPA compliance on corporations, but the high cost of FCPA
enforcement is also a significant problem for government agencies.165 As a
general matter, regulatory systems based on disclosure and shame can be
cheaper than prohibition and punishment166 because they rely on the weight of
public opinion to pressure bad actors, rather than on an investigation or
prosecution.167 Even further, the disclosures originally made by the corporation
are likely to assist prosecutors in building their case if a presumption of
legitimacy happens to be rebutted.168
The safe harbor option should not function as a way for corporations to
hide corrupt activity, despite the need to assuage corporate concerns regarding
the FCPA’s ambiguous application to charity. It is vital that the safe harbor’s
presumption of legitimacy can be rebutted in cases of truly egregious bribery
or a total failure to maintain an accounting system that prevents bribery. As
one commentator noted: “[I]t is a fallacy to believe that the public outcry over
the economic and human consequences of corporate scandals is itself sufficient

162 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 285 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See generally Alexander Volokh, The Pitfalls of the Environmental Right-to-Know, 2002 UTAH L.
REV. 805 (discussing the problems associated with disclosure-based regulation in the area of environmental
law).
163 See Volokh, supra note 162, at 807; see also Williams, supra note 106, at 1290 (“Environmental data
can be one of the hardest types of information to obtain in usable form.”).
164 See Bixby, supra note 161, at 119 (“[NGOs may] also help business firms design and implement
compliance policies to detect bribery before it becomes public.”).
165 Philip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 169, 175 (2006) (concluding that the FCPA is under-enforced due to
enforcement costs).
166 Cf. id. at 199 (comparing shaming favorably with the “limits of prosecution-heavy anti-corruption
strategies”).
167 Cf. Skeel, supra note 142, at 1816 (“Added to the expressive virtues of shaming is its low cost.”).
168 See William V. Luneburg, The Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation: Where We Are Now and
Where We Should Be Going, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85, 110 (2009).
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to cause corporations to change their for-profit nature . . . unilaterally.”169 With
the presumption of legitimacy of the safe harbor option fully rebuttable, the
FCPA would still remain a strong anticorruption tool.
IV. MOVING FORWARD: BENEFITS OF THE SAFE HARBOR OPTION
In practice, offering the option of safe harbor from FCPA enforcement
should have substantial benefits for both the regulated communities as well as
corporate charity programs. First, this Part discusses another law, the newly
enacted Dodd-Frank Section 1504, which also relies on disclosure-based
regulation to combat corruption. It identifies potential problems within Section
1504 and how the FCPA safe harbor option might improve the application of
Section 1504. Finally, section B details how the safe harbor option and an
emphasis on disclosure would benefit corporate philanthropy and international
development in general.
A. Drawling Parallels: Dodd-Frank Section 1504
The United States has attempted to further combat international corruption
through Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.170 However, this disclosure-based law appears to have many of
the same defects as the FCPA when applied to corporate charity. Although
Section 1504 represents an excellent example of regulation by disclosure,
many of its defects might be ameliorated by offering the FCPA safe harbor
option.
Section 1504 requires all public companies operating in the extractive
industries (such as mining or drilling for oil or natural gas)171 to disclose all
payments that are made to foreign governments.172 The extractive sector was
singled out by this law because of the industry’s reputation for widespread
corruption and role in the “resource curse.”173 The resource curse refers to how
some countries with great natural resources remain underdeveloped and

169 Besmer, supra note 12, at 304; accord PETERS & RÖß, supra note 135, at 9 (“[V]oluntary business
activity should never be treated as a substitute for effective regulation . . . .”).
170 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1504, 124
Stat. 1376, 2220–22 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
171 See id.; David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the
Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 345 (2011).
172 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1504.
173 Firger, supra note 104, at 1050.
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plagued by corruption.174 In these nations, the financial benefits of natural
resources never reach the general population because corrupt leaders embezzle
the money away from their destitute citizens.175
Section 1504 attempts to increase transparency in the extractive industries
to allow citizens in developing nations to hold their leaders accountable for the
profits gained from their country’s natural resources.176 Section 1504 does not
replace the FCPA. Instead, the two laws work together to increase transparency
and decrease corruption in the resource-rich countries where the extractive
industry is prevalent.177
Unfortunately, the SEC’s recently released rules for Section 1504,178
specifically the definition of payments which must be disclosed, create many
of the same problems with corporate charity that exist within the FCPA.
For example, the SEC’s rules specifically exclude “social payments” from
mandatory disclosure.179 The SEC defines social payments as the kind a
corporation might make to build a school or hospital abroad.180 With this
definition, the SEC has created a loophole that will allow significant amounts
of money to be transferred to foreign governments undisclosed. As an
example, a payment like the $130,000 that Chevron donated in Angola181
might avoid disclosure as a social payment despite its clear connection to
Chevron’s oil negotiations in the country.182 At the urging of corrupt foreign
leaders, companies could simply label their payments as social development
174

Id. at 1048.
Id.
176 Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,365, 56,366 (Sept. 12, 2012)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249). Another important policy aim of Section 1504 is to provide investors
and shareholders greater access to information. Letter from Benjamin L. Cardin, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Mary
L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/df-title-xv/specialized-disclosures/specializeddisclosures-94.pdf.
177 See GRANT D. ALDONAS, SPLIT ROCK INT’L, INC., ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1504 OF THE WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2–4 (2011), available at http://www.api.org/policy/upload/
Analysis_Section_1504_paper.pdf. The FCPA targets the “supply” side of corruption by seeking to prevent
corporations from paying bribes to foreign officials. Spalding, supra note 25, at 360–61. By empowering
foreign citizens to hold their governments accountable for money received by extractive corporations, see
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,367, Section 1504 attempts to
control the “demand” side of bribery in the extractive industry. See generally Everett et al., supra note 27, at
518 (discussing the general division between the “supply” and “demand” sides of bribery).
178 Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,365.
179 Id. at 56,379.
180 Id. at 56,378–79.
181 See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
182 See Frynas, supra note 13, at 584.
175

PISANO GALLEYSPROOFS1

634

3/5/2013 11:40 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:607

projects. Then the payments would not need to be disclosed and corrupt
foreign leaders could continue to embezzle money from their countries with
impunity, frustrating the goals of Section 1504.183
Additionally, the lines that the SEC draws between “infrastructure
improvements” and “social payments” create ambiguity that might chill
corporate giving abroad. The SEC gives examples of infrastructure
improvements, such as building a road to reach oil or minerals in a country, as
compared to a social payment, such as building a hospital or school.184
However, it is easy to imagine potential corporate gifts that might fit both
definitions. If a company pursues a new mining operation in a region where
there is no accessible emergency care for its workers, would building a hospital
still be considered a social payment if it was used predominantly (but not
exclusively) by mine employees? Would building a school still be considered a
social payment if it was required by the host country—or if it was considered
by the host country as a factor in awarding business contracts?185 If a company
builds a road to access its mine (an infrastructure improvement) but then
continues the road to access the nearest local school (a social payment), must it
disclose the entire cost of the road or would it bifurcate the cost of the road to
the mine from the cost of the same road to the school?
Many commentators have suggested that Section 1504 might have a
negative effect on U.S. extractive business abroad.186 The new law may also
have a chilling effect on corporate charity. If a company is unsure about
whether its community project is an infrastructure improvement or a social
payment, it may hesitate to engage charitably in the host community,
especially if an infrastructure improvement might cause backlash.187
Furthermore, it is possible that the Section 1504 disclosures might increase the
risk of FCPA prosecutions. Commentators have already noticed that many
183

Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,366–67.
Id. at 56,378–79.
185 Kazakhstan, for example, considers mining companies’ social payments when awarding contracts and
reported $314.4 million in social and local infrastructure contributions from the extractive industry in 2009
alone. Letter from Publish What You Pay Coalition, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 25 n.104 (Feb. 25, 2010) [hereinafter PWYP Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s742-10/s74210-29.pdf.
186 See ALDONAS, supra note 177; Branden Carl Berns, Note, Will Oil and Gas Issuers Leave U.S. Equity
Markets in Response to Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act? Can They Afford Not to?, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 758, 783–86.
187 Cf. Frynas, supra note 13, at 593 (discussing conflict that arose in an attempt to redistribute the
benefits of an oil company’s charitable engagement). See generally supra notes 136–38 and accompanying
text.
184
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FCPA actions grow out of other corporate disclosures rather than independent
government investigations.188
The creation of the safe harbor option for FCPA enforcement ought to
ameliorate many of these concerns. First, it would provide the extractive
industry with the rebuttable presumption of legitimacy for FCPA enforcement,
an additional benefit for disclosing—or in some cases over-disclosing if the
line between infrastructure improvement and social payment is unclear. This
rebuttable presumption of legitimacy could also help assuage some of the
concerns of an FCPA enforcement action following from Section 1504
disclosures, as well as provide companies additional benefit to offset the costs
of making the disclosures. It may be that if the charity-focused system is
successful, regulators might find that it should be expanded, offering a
rebuttable presumption of FCPA legitimacy for all payments disclosed under
Section 1504.189
B. Improving Development
Greater disclosure and transparency in corporate philanthropy will have
beneficial effects on international charity and development in general. The FCPA
safe harbor option would incentivize disclosure of charitable contributions.
Likewise, Dodd-Frank Section 1504, assuming it is applied appropriately to
corporate charity, should also provide vital insights into corporate philanthropy.
This transparency will make development and aid programs more effective on a
global scale by maintaining accounting standards, increasing accountability, and
allowing for greater cooperation.

Furthermore, although this Comment deals with corporate charity and
corporate social responsibility programs, NGOs and international charitable
organizations often face similar problems with regard to how the FCPA might
impact their work abroad.190 Greater disclosure would incentivize corporations
to improve their accounting of charitable programs, something that has been a
major problem with international corporate giving in the past.191 Although
some costs may increase for companies, higher accounting standards will
188 Cf. Low et al., supra note 129, at 1 (discussing the increased reporting and certification requirements
that make it more likely that an FCPA violation would be brought against a company without the DOJ or SEC
independently discovering the violation).
189 The wisdom of such an expansion (offering the rebuttable presumption of legitimacy for all payments
disclosed under Section 1504, not merely charitable or social payments) is beyond the scope of this Comment.
190 See Helmer & Deming, supra note 36, at 599.
191 COADY, supra note 10, at 12, 41.
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enable corporations to accurately take credit for their donations and the
benefits that come along with such generosity.192 For consumers or investors
who wish to judge corporations by their charitable impact,193 disclosure will
assist in distinguishing companies that are truly dedicated to philanthropy from
those that merely have snazzy advertising campaigns.194 Some well-known
companies considered to be “ethical leaders” do not live up to their advertising
claims.195 For example, Ben & Jerry’s advertised its Rainforest Crunch icecream as a partnership with indigenous communities, but the company did not
actually buy nuts from any indigenous communities for years.196 On the other
hand, greater accounting and transparency may help rehabilitate multinational
corporations that have undeserved negative reputations despite a strong
commitment to development abroad.197
Improved transparency will also increase the effectiveness and
accountability of corporate development programs, often criticized by
development experts, by allowing civil society to monitor the effectiveness of
corporate charity.198 Commentators suggest that corporate philanthropy often
falls short of its intended goals because many companies lack staff with social
development experience.199 With greater transparency, the NGO and
development community would be able to offer feedback and advice for the
corporate programs.200 Finally, disclosure of projects and partners may lower
192 Jennings & Entine, supra note 136, at 14–15 (identifying benefits such as more favorable placement
on consumers’ “ethical barometer[s]” or inclusion in mutual funds that screen for “good” companies).
193 See supra notes 147–54 and accompanying text.
194 Other authors have commented on this dearth of information regarding a corporation’s actual ethical
engagement in the community because, “[i]n a global economy, information about the social effects of a
company’s actions . . . is increasingly relevant to at least some investors in the United States, and yet that
information is much less available in the market than is financial information.” Williams, supra note 106, at
1201.
195 See generally Jennings & Entine, supra note 136.
196 See id. at 42–46. The Body Shop is another company whose actual business activities have failed to
live up to its ethical reputation, but it has “escaped serious scrutiny of [its] corporate performance.” Id. at 52–
55; see also Kahn, supra note 12, at 584 (describing corporate giving as a form of advertisement).
197 Jennings & Entine, supra note 136, at 49 (“Despite regular appearances on ‘dishonorable’ lists,
controversial multinationals such as natural resource and chemical companies . . . actively engage their
community responsibilities [and] give millions of dollars to charity . . . .”).
198 See Frynas, supra note 13, at 581 (“However, the effectiveness of CSR initiatives . . . has been
increasingly questioned, and there is mounting evidence of a gap between the stated intentions of business
leaders and their actual . . . impact in the real world.”).
199 Id. at 591. The 2009 Giving in Numbers report calculated that in a third of companies polled, more
than 100 grants were handled by each full-time philanthropy-focused employee (defined as an employee who
devoted a minimum of 20% of his or her time to philanthropic activities). COADY, supra note 10, at 45.
200 See Frynas, supra note 13, at 591. Encouraging greater transparency will enable recipient communities
to create “people’s audits” and demand greater accountability in their communities. TSUNAMI RELIEF
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costs incurred by corporations seeking local partner NGOs. For companies that
are expanding development projects into new markets or responding rapidly to
a natural disaster, vetting NGO partner organizations can be extremely timeconsuming.201 A recent study by Deloitte found that the biggest challenge
identified by company executives in building an anticorruption program was
“managing third-party relationships.”202 Providing information about other
corporate–NGO partnerships will help companies create new corporate charity
programs with greater ease.
Greater disclosure of corporate programs would also have a substantial
impact on international giving and development as a whole. With so many
diverse actors in the development sphere, it can be difficult to coordinate
activity and “approach large-scale, complex problems in a top-down and
scalable way.”203 With greater disclosure, NGOs, government programs, and
corporations would be able to coordinate their efforts. It would be less likely
that duplicative projects in developing nations would receive funding,204 while
at the same time holes in development schemes or aid flows could be identified
and remedied.
CONCLUSION
Two years after the devastating earthquake, Haiti continues to rebuild.
Despite considerable challenges, reports are tentatively positive.205 The
response to the Haitian earthquake highlighted the generosity of U.S.

OPERATIONS, supra note 107, at 4; accord Todung Mulya Lubis, Country Ownership and Participatory
Decision-Making as Means to Enhance Transparency, in TSUNAMI RELIEF OPERATIONS, supra note 107, at 10.
201 See Helmer & Deming, supra note 36, at 620 (“[I]n an emergency response, such as when a major
disaster strikes a country, NGOs delivering humanitarian aid must hire local staff very quickly. In these
circumstances, they have no time to do any sort of background or reputational check and no chance to get to
know the people involved . . . .”).
202 Victoria Makarova, Anti-Corruption Practices Survey 2011—Cloudy with a Chance of Prosecution?,
in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS INSTITUTE 2012, at 559, 569 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 35502, 2012).
203 Little, supra note 8, at 1106–07; see also Frynas, supra note 13, at 592–93; Gopakumar Krishnan
Thampi, Exploring the Role of Community Feedback Mechanisms, in TSUNAMI RELIEF OPERATIONS, supra
note 107, at 61, 61.
204 See Frynas, supra note 13, at 592 (“[A]n oil company in Nigeria built a road which ran parallel to
another road built by the Niger Delta Development Commission . . . .”).
205 Laurent Dubois & Deborah Jenson, Op-Ed., Haiti Can Be Rich Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, at
A19.
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corporations.206 At the same time, however, it revealed the discouraging effect
corruption can have on development efforts.207
This paradox was further illustrated by the effects of the FCPA on Haitian
disaster relief. The FCPA discouraged bona fide corporate charity and
investment, but at the same time it failed to capture the rampant corruption in
the rebuilding effort.208
If the safe harbor option proposed by this Comment had been available
during the Haitian disaster relief efforts, corporations could have gained a
presumption of legitimacy for their donations, provided they were willing to
disclose their payments. This could have ameliorated corporate concerns of
FCPA prosecution for bona fide charity. In turn, greater disclosure would have
allowed civil society to monitor corporate gifts and create a public shaming
process against corporations engaging in corrupt charity.
The newly enacted Section 1504 employs a similar focus on disclosure
rather than prohibition. Although this law shows great promise, the SEC’s
rules leave significant loopholes that unscrupulous companies or foreign
leaders could use to funnel corrupt donations around the disclosure
requirements.
The intersection of U.S. anticorruption law and corporate philanthropy
deserves special attention. Foreign charity without transparency or
accountability will never produce long-lasting development, but development
goals will likewise be ill-served if U.S. law discourages corporate
philanthropy. Anticorruption law will benefit from greater flexibility and
inclusiveness to encourage honest corporate philanthropy around the world.
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